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Economists and pundits have complained for years that Americans do not save
enough. Economists, in keeping with our reputation, have tended to use bland
words like “unsustainable” or “problematic”; pundits, preferring more colorful
language, have called the American saving rate “dismal” and “pathetic.”
As economists, we lean toward the bland terminology. But, to quote former
Council of Economic Advisors chair Herbert Stein, “Unsustainable trends, sooner
or later, come to an end.”
That end appears now to be coming, much more suddenly than anyone ex-
pected. Indeed, the collapse in household spending over the past six months
is a principal source of the gloom currently emanating from macroeconomic
forecasters.
After so much lamentation about low saving, it may be a bit hard for the
public to stomach economists’ new worries about a drop in spending. But the
contradiction can be understood by analogy to the prayer of Saint Augustine, who
after a youth spent in debauchery decided to convert to Christianity to preserve
his mortal soul. He was still enjoying his sinful ways when he made that fateful
decision, so his ﬁrst prayer was “Lord, make me chaste – but not quite yet.”
Saint Augustine may not have had a good excuse for gradualism, but
economists do: The costs of adjustment to a permanently higher saving rate
would likely be substantially smaller if that increase were spread out over
the course of several years than if it happens all at once. (This is part of
the motivation behind several items in the recently passed stimulus bill that
aimed to revive near-term consumer spending, especially on durable goods like
automobiles.)
Optimal or not, our best guess (illustrated below by forecasts from a simple
model) is that the drop in overall consumption spending will not be speedily
reversed; indeed, we project that the saving rate will rise a bit further from
current levels before stabilizing somewhere not far below the saving rates that
prevailed before the era of ﬁnancial liberalization that started in the late 1970s.
But we would not be greatly surprised if the saving rate ultimately rises even
more than in our most extreme projection. In answer to the question in our title,
our view is that American consumers are not merely resting from their former
role as the world’s champion consumers, they are permanently reforming their
spending patterns, in response to the end of the period of ever-more-available
credit that fueled the unsustainably high spending of recent years.
22 Theory and Data
2.1 A Simple Model
Figure 1 depicts a consumption function c(m) that relates a stylized consumer’s
optimal spending-to-labor-income ratio c to the monetary-resources-to-labor-
income ratio m; the consumer is assumed to be behaving according to a simple
buﬀer-stock saving model like that of Carroll (2009). This consumer is impatient:
In the absence of uncertainty, spending would exceed the amount consistent
with wealth maintenance. For such a consumer, precautionary motives are the
only reason to hold any positive wealth. (The consumption function is concave
because at lower and lower levels of wealth the consumer’s precautionary motive
gets stronger and stronger).
The shallowly sloped line plots, for each level of wealth, the level of spending
that is “sustainable” in the sense that, at that level of spending, expected mt+1 in
the next period will be unchanged from the current level of mt. (Sustainable
spending is simply the sum of expected labor income and expected interest
income; it is upward sloping because with more assets, the consumer expects
to earn more interest income).
The target ˇ m is the level of m at which the consumer will choose the sustainable
level of consumption.
2.2 A Wealth Shock
Our ﬁrst experiment with the model is motivated by the historic shock to house-
hold wealth depicted in ﬁgure 2. Estimates of the magnitude of the wealth shock
range as high as $13 trillion (Baily, Lund, and Atkins (2009)); this is certainly
the largest collapse in asset values since the Great Depression.
Leading up to the period t when the wealth shock occurs, our consumer is
assumed to have been holding the target amount of wealth ˇ m; the consumer’s
pre-shock position is indicated by the black dot at the point {ˇ m,ˇ c}. In period t,
wealth drops to mt, inducing a corresponding drop in consumption to ct, indicated
by the red dot at {mt,c t}. The subsequent evolution of consumption and wealth
are represented by the series of red dots leading back toward {ˇ m,ˇ c}.
The next ﬁgure shows the path of the consumer’s saving rate. Before the shock,
saving was constant at the level necessary to maintain the wealth-to-income ratio
at its target. When the wealth shock hits, the saving rate jumps up substantially
(this is the ‘wealth eﬀect’ in this model). Subsequently, as wealth builds back up
toward its target, the saving rate subsides toward its equilibrium value.
32.3 A Rise In Unemployment Expectations
Figure 5 shows the history of our favorite measure of consumer sentiment: The
University of Michigan’s index of unemployment expectations. In prior work, we
have found that this indicator has substantial predictive power for consumption
spending. And, as the ﬁgure shows, the recent survey results show consumers
exhibiting near-record pessimism about future job market conditions.
Our next experiment, in ﬁgure 6, examines the consequences of an increase in
unemployment expectations in the model.
Beginning from the same original consumption function as before, the new
consumption function corresponding to the state of heightened fear is labelled
“c(m) after unemployment rate increase.” Starting, again, from the original
steady state, consumption drops sharply, then as precautionary wealth builds
up spending gradually recovers. The saving path follows the same pattern as
in ﬁgure 4: A sudden rise followed by a gradual subsidence. (The pattern
of consumption after the shock is again indicated by dots. We show only 5
periods of evolution because presumably unemployment expectations will not
remain elevated longer than ﬁve years; when unemployment expectations return
to normal, consumption would jump back to the original consumption function.
Of course, real-world changes in expectations are not likely to be one-oﬀ events
like those we simulate, so the changes in spending would not be expected to be
so sharp).
While unemployment expectations will likely return to more normal levels
within a few years, it is possible that the crisis will have a long-lasting residual
eﬀect on consumers’ generalized degree of uncertainty. After the “Great Mod-
eration” period of relative macroeconomic stability of the prior twenty years,
households’ perceptions of the degree of economic risk that they were subject
to may have fallen substantially. Lingering memories of the current crisis could
therefore have a very long-lasting eﬀect in boosting the saving rate (and reducing
consumers’ appetite for borrowing).
This leads us to a discussion of the ﬁnal element of the crisis: Developments
in the credit market.
2.4 A Relaxation of Borrowing Constraints
Our ﬁnal experiment with the model is motivated by the literature that attributes
the runup in consumer debt depicted as the bottom line in ﬁgure 2 to a relaxation
of borrowing constraints. The rapid pace of credit expansion, especially over the
past few years, is evident in ﬁgure 7. Since the borrowing outcome depends
on both credit demand and credit supply, the rapid pace of debt growth over
this period is not prima facie proof of relaxing credit conditions; but plenty of
4evidence suggests that increasing credit availability was the main driver of credit
growth (cf., for example, Mian and Suﬁ (2008) and the references therein; see
also Dynan and Kohn (2007), who argue that the increase in house prices was
partly responsible for the relaxation of credit).
The function labelled “Orig c(m)” in ﬁgure 8 reﬂects an assumed initial sit-
uation in which borrowing is prohibited. The function “New c(m)” shows how
the consumption function changes if a ﬁnancial liberalization suddenly makes
borrowing easier. The eﬀect is intuitive: For any given level of monetary assets
m, the consumer with greater access to credit spends more. Rather than needing
to rely on personal saving as a buﬀer against uncertainty, the consumer plans to
use his credit line in case of emergencies, so there is less need for direct wealth
holding.
Before the relaxation of borrowing constraints, we assume that the consumer
was at the target level of m, as signalized by the black dot at the intersection of
the ‘sustainable c’ line and the consumption function. The rightmost (highest)
red dot on the “New c(m)” function shows the point to which consumption jumps
when easier borrowing is allowed; the remaining dots on the new consumption
function show the path by which consumption evolves downward as wealth falls
toward its new, lower target.
The consumer in our example is so impatient, and the availability of credit (post
liberalization) is so generous, that the new target level of wealth is negative; in
the new equilibrium, the consumer relies upon his borrowing ability to provide
the buﬀering capacity that was previously provided by his wealth stock.
The path of the saving rate following the liberalization is shown in ﬁgure 9.
The initial upward leap in spending corresponds to a sharp decline in the saving
rate. Subsequently, the saving rate gradually increases, but never fully recovers to
its pre-liberalization level (the lower level of target wealth permitted by increased
borrowing does not require as high a saving rate in order to be sustained).
This ﬁgure underpins our interpretation of the eﬀects of the credit boom of
the past few decades. We view that history as an ongoing sequence of modest
relaxations of borrowing constraints, rather than a giant one-time event. Every
year, credit conditions got slightly easier (with only a few backward steps).
Each particular increase in credit availability would, by itself, have resulted
in a saving response like the one implicit in our ﬁgure (sharp decline followed
by gradual recovery); but in each case borrowing constraints were subsequently
further relaxed before the saving rate could recover. Since credit availability
cannot get easier forever (that would be unsustainable!), the saving rate should
stop being depressed whenever credit-easing ends.
The period of ever-looser credit has certainly now come to an end. Perhaps
the best way to measure changes in the supply of credit is through the Federal
Reserve’s ongoing Senior Loan Oﬃcer Opinion Survey, which reports the fraction
5of loan oﬃcers who say conditions are tightening minus the proportion who say
they are easing. (This only measures conditions at banks, and since much of
the increase in credit supply in the last decade came from nonbank lenders, the
survey is an imperfect measure).
Figure 10, which shows the results of that survey, should remove any doubt
that in the period since the crisis began, credit conditions have tightened sharply.
The eﬀects of a credit cutback, in the model, are simply the inverse of the
eﬀects of an expansion: Consumption drops, the saving rate rises, and there is
gradual adjustment toward a new equilibrium in which even impatient consumers
ﬁnd it prudent to hold a larger buﬀer stock of wealth than before.
Everyone agrees that much of the credit tightening is necessary and permanent
(the days of No Income, No Job, No Assets (NINJA) mortgage loans will not
return). But the demand for credit has surely fallen also, as fearful consumers
refrain from borrowing even when credit is available to them. Some combination
of reduced demand and tightening supply accounts for the impressive collapse in
net borrowing (‘deleveraging’) shown at the end of ﬁgure 7.
A key question for the longer-term outlook is how long this period of deleverag-
ing will last, and how much lower the ‘target’ level of leverage is than its current
(still-elevated) level. These are diﬃcult questions with no clear answer; but we
are in the camp that believes that the long-run equilibrium level of household
debt will be substantially lower than the levels of the past few years, as a result
both of consumers’ newfound fears of overindebtedness and as a result of ﬁnancial
markets’ presumably greater prudence in oﬀering credit going forward.
3 Consumption So Far
Wealth has cratered; credit availability has tightened sharply; and consumer
conﬁdence has collapsed.
The eﬀect of these events on household spending is best measured using the
BEA’s index of retail sales, which is more timely and less subject to revision
than more comprehensive measures of spending like Personal Consumption Ex-
penditures (PCE). Figure 11 shows the level of retail sales over the period since
the beginning of the recession (in December 2007, according to the National
Bureau of Economic Research), along with the pattern of retail sales spending
following the other business cycle peaks in the postwar period. (The level of sales
is indexed to 100 at the beginning of each business cycle peak). The gray interval
in the diagram shows, for each month after the recession peak, the minimum and
maximum levels of relative retail sales across all previous postwar recessions.
Given the magnitude of the shocks, it is no surprise that the ﬁgure shows that
the decline in retail sales in the current recession is considerably larger than in
6any previous postwar recession. In the latest data available at this writing, retail
sales in April 2009 were estimated to be about 10 percent lower than when the
recession began. In contrast, by this time after previous recessions peaks, retail
sales had on average fully recovered to their peak level.
Other indicators yield similar conclusions; for example, the decline in con-
sumption spending in the fourth quarter of 2008 was the sharpest drop in the
past 50 years; a Rockefeller Institute report by Boyd and Dadayan (2009) ﬁnds
that state-level data for sales taxes (presumably, an indicator of sales) showed
the sharpest drop in 50 years in the fourth quarter of 2008. Automobile sales
have dropped by around 50 percent. And so on.
4 Our Forecast
The path of consumer spending is famously diﬃcult to forecast. Conveniently,
Robert Hall (1978) provided economists with a good excuse for our forecasting
failures by proving that standard consumption theory implies that forecasting
changes in consumption should be mathematically impossible.
A subsequent literature has nevertheless found some reasonably predictable
patterns in consumption growth. For example, Carroll, Sommer, and Slacalek
(2008) (henceforth, CSS) ﬁnd that, across a set of 13 developed economies for
which suﬃcient time series data are available, behavior deviates from the random
walk theory in a simple way: After correcting for measurement error, consumption
growth has a substantial degree of serial correlation, or ‘momentum.’
Concretely, CSS estimate an equation of the form
∂C C Ct+1 = ς + χEt−2[∂C C Ct]+ t+1 (1)
where the expectation of lagged consumption growth is constructed using data
available at date t−2 (the lag is necessary to correct for measurement error and
time aggregation in the consumption data). At a quarterly frequency, the serial
correlation coeﬃcient for the predictable component of consumption growth in
most countries (including the U.S.) is about χ =0 .75.
(We neglect here the conceptually important distinction between spending
on durable goods, nondurables, and services. Although theory suggests that
this distinction should be important, and evidence does show that spending on
durables is much more variable than that on nondurables or services, we ﬁnd that
the aggregate forecasting equation that lumps all spending components together
works about as well as what we are able to get by disaggregating.)
For our projections here, we rely on an extension of the CSS methodology
designed to permit the measurement of wealth eﬀects on consumption, developed
in Carroll, Otsuka, and Slacalek (2009) (henceforth, COS).
7In addition to the above equation, COS estimate a simple relation between
consumption and wealth:
∂C C Ct = α0 + α∂B B Bt−1 + αMUMUt−1 + αFFFFt−1 + ηt, (2)
whereC C C denotes aggregate consumption, B B B aggregate wealth, MU unemployment
expectations (measured by the Michigan survey), FF the Federal funds rate,
∂C C Ct =Δ C C Ct/C C Ct−5 and ∂B B Bt−1 =Δ B B Bt−1/C C Ct−5. Parameter α is the immediate
(next-quarter) marginal propensity to consume out of wealth. Because consump-
tion responds slowly to shocks (χ   0), the eventual marginal propensity to
consume ¯ κ is substantially larger: ¯ κ = α
χ(1−χ).
Estimates of the immediate and eventual marginal propensities to consume for
the most recent sample (1960Q1–2008Q4) are shown in Tables 1 and 2 respec-
tively. Our preferred model implies that the eventual eﬀect on consumption of a
$1 dollar increase in wealth is about 6 cents. The eﬀect of an increase in housing
wealth—9 cents—is substantially larger than that of ﬁnancial wealth—4 cents.
1
We use the COS model to investigate future consumption paths implied by
three alternative scenarios for the future dynamics of house prices as described
in Table 3 and shown in Figure 12. The baseline scenario is motivated by the
assumptions of the recent stress test of major banks undertaken by the Federal
Reserve, Oﬃce of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation. That scenario assumes that house prices fall by 14 percent and 4
percent in 2009 and 2010 respectively, in nominal terms, which implies a 14.4
percent fall for per capita real housing wealth this year and 6.7 percent fall next
year.
2
The second, “pessimistic” scenario mirrors the adverse scenario in the stress
tests by imposing a 22 percent nominal house price fall in 2009 followed by a 7
percent fall in 2010 (22.4 and 9.7 percent respectively, in real per capita terms).
The last, “optimistic” scenario is the mirror image of the pessimistic scenario
around the baseline. It imposes a 6 percent fall in nominal house prices in 2009
and a 1 percent fall in 2010.
In all three scenarios we assume that consumers form unemployment expec-
tations by updating slowly from experts’ unemployment expectations as in Car-
roll (2003). (Motivated by the stress test assumptions, experts’ unemployment
1In addition to any direct causation from an unanticipated change in wealth to resulting changes in
consumption, our measured ‘eﬀects’ likely capture the inﬂuence of other economic circumstances that are
correlated with the lagged changes in wealth. For example, an increase in credit availability might allow the
bidding-up of asset prices as well as a faster-than-normal increase in spending. The chief argument for the
simplistic approach we adopt here, in which all such inﬂuences are combined, is that we are not persuaded that
there is a reliable method to disentangle the various plausible inﬂuences. Our view is that a simple summary of
past history of the kind embodied in our estimates may be more useful and less fragile than a more ambitious
approach which would attempt to decompose the ‘eﬀect’ into more primitive sources.
2The document describing the stress test does not specify projected paths beyond next year (Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2009)). We assumed the growth rate of real per capita housing
wealth will return to 2.1 percent (its post-1960 mean).
8expectations vary across scenarios as given in Table 3.) Finally, we use the
expectations of economic forecasters reported by the Consensus Economics survey
(http://www.consensuseconomics.com/) as our best guess about the future Fed
funds rate.
Figure 13 shows the projected consumption expenditure paths under the three
scenarios (of Table 3) and the two models—with total net worth, and with wealth
decomposed into separate housing and ﬁnancial components (Tables 1 and 2).
We compare the six paths with the consumption forecasts reported by Consensus
Economics survey. Qualitatively, the more pessimistic the scenario, the lower is
consumption expenditure. In addition, consumption projections of the disaggre-
gated wealth model (in which housing and ﬁnancial wealth enter separately as
independent variables) are lower than those of the aggregate model because the
estimated MPC out of housing wealth is considerably larger than the MPC out
of ﬁnancial wealth. Quantitatively, our models imply that per capita spending
will decrease from its current (2009Q4) level of $26,800 (in year 2000 dollars) by
0.6–1.5 percent before it starts to grow later this year or in 2010.
Figure 14 compares the saving rates with the benchmark saving rate implied
by the Consensus Economics survey.
3 Because of lower consumption paths our
models generally predict higher saving rates than the Consensus forecast. After
the initial dip in 2009Q4 (caused by a substantial fall in disposable income—3.5
percent in real per capita terms) the saving rate typically tends to remain close to
the current level of 4 percent but in the most pessimistic scenario could increase
to as much as 5.4 percent by the end of 2011.
A more optimistic view is that the sluggishness in consumption growth in
historical data reﬂects the slow transmission of macroeconomic news to the
consumers’ consciousness; inattentive consumers are normally slow to react to
macroeconomic news because it takes them a while to notice it. This is the
optimistic interpretation of our empirical model’s results, because it would be
hard to argue that consumers have not noticed the current economic crisis.
Their adjustment may therefore have occurred much more quickly than usual,
so that the remaining degree of negative ‘momentum’ may be negligible.
A further possibility worth mentioning is that spending on durable goods may
post sharp gains later this year; as Lawrence Summers has pointed out, recent
levels of automobile purchases are far below even the level required merely to
replace the stock that is depreciating due to wear-and-tear or accidents. Indeed,
a variety of measures from the recently passed stimulus bill designed to encourage
spending on durable goods may make themselves felt later in the year and boost
spending on those categories.
3In all 7 scenarios we assume that disposable income will grow as expected by the experts interviewed by
Consensus Economics.
9But as noted above, the aggregate forecasting equation has tended to work
about as well for aggregate spending as for its components; we take this as
suggesting that spending on nondurable goods is likely to continue to be quite
weak even if durable goods spending recovers sharply. (In this case, one could
argue that consumers have indeed been ‘resting’ in their purchases of durable
goods).
Even if durables recover and nondurables stabilize in the near term, we are
inclined to believe that the end of the recent period of rapid credit expansion
portends a substantially higher saving rate two or three years hence than has
prevailed over the past few years. Returning to our remark in the introduction,
this would be the most favorable plausible scenario, because it would reﬂect a
path of Augustinian gradualism on the way to long-term reform. Such a scenario
would probably be the best outcome that can reasonably be hoped for.
5 Conclusion
Since household spending has traditionally accounted for more than 2/3 of GDP,
consumer behavior always ends up being a decisive factor in macroeconomic
outcomes. But the degree of uncertainty about the spending outlook is even
greater now than usual. While our forecast is for slightly weaker spending growth
than called for by the Consensus survey of macroeconomic forecasters, we would
be remiss if we did not admit that the range of plausible outcomes is very wide.
No professional forecaster would be shocked if the saving rate by the end of next
year were as high as 8 percent (as assumed in a pessimistic scenario in a recent
report by Baily, Lund, and Atkins (2009) of the McKinsey Global Institute) or
as low as 2 percent.
Over the longer term, our best guess is that the gut-wrenching economic
uncertainty experienced in the current crisis will leave a lasting impression on
consumers’ attitudes toward debt; the combination of greater household uncer-
tainty and less adventurous credit supply by lenders, along with households’
need to rebuild retirement and other wealth stocks devastated by the crisis, will
produce an eventual personal saving rate that is much higher than it has been in
many years.
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∂C C Ct = α0 + α1¯ ∂B B Bt−1 + α2¯ ∂B B B
f
t−1 + α3¯ ∂B B Bh
t−1 + α4MUt−1 + α5FFt−1
Next-Quarter Eﬀect Extra
of $1 Change in Wealth Variables
Total Financial Housing Unemp Exp Fed Fund Test of
¯ ∂B B Bt−1 ¯ ∂B B B
f
t−1 ¯ ∂B B Bh
t−1 MUt−1 FFt−1 ¯ ∂B B Bf = ¯ ∂B B Bh ¯ R2
0.008∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ −0.298 0.249
(0.003) (0.032) (0.213)
0.007∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ −0.314 0.371 0.250
(0.003) (0.007) (0.033) (0.215)
Notes: Sample period is 1960Q1–2008Q4. Standard errors in parentheses. {*,**,***}=Statistical signiﬁcance
at {10, 5, 1} percent. Coeﬃcients on wealth variables reﬂect MPCs in the quarter following a wealth change.
The wealth variables are from the Flow of Funds balance sheets for the household sector. MU is the fraction of
consumers who expect the unemployment rate to decline over the next year minus the fraction who expect it
to increase. FF is the nominal Fed funds rate. The wealth and consumption variables were normalized by the
level of consumption expenditures at t − 4 to correct for the long-term trends in consumption and wealth. The
equations without the extra variables exhibited serial correlation and so standard errors for those equations are
corrected for serial correlation using the Newey–West procedure with 4 lags.Table 2 Consumption Growth Momentum and the Eventual MPC
∂C C Ct+1 = c0 + χEt−1∂C C Ct + εt+1
Variables used Consumption Growth Implied Eventual
to forecast Momentum Coeﬃcient MPC out of
Et−1∂C C Ct χ Total B B B Financial B B Bf Housing B B Bh
B B B, MU, FF 0.84∗∗∗ 0.061
(0.14)
B B Bf,B B Bh, MU, FF 0.81∗∗∗ 0.049 0.088
(0.14)
Notes: Sample period is 1960Q1–2008Q4. Standard errors are in parentheses. {*,**,***} = Statistical
signiﬁcance at {10,5,1} percent. The eventual MPCs are calculated from the formula αj/χ(1−χ) where αj is the
corresponding next-quarter MPC estimated in table 1. Standard errors for all equations are heteroskedasticity
and serial-correlation robust. When more instruments are used to forecast ∂C C Ct (for example, interest rate spread
and the change in unemployment over the previous year), the estimate of χ tends to rise further and the standard
error falls further. The measure of the change in wealth used for the regressions is the ∂B B B measure deﬁned in
the text, as this can be measured without an estimate of χ, unlike the ¯ ∂B B B measures used in the previous table.Table 3 Economic Scenarios: The Good, the Baseline and the Ugly
Scenario Variable 2009 2010 2011 2012
Baseline House Prices −14 −4 −−
Unemployment Rate 8.48 .87 .96 .8
Disposable Income (Per Capita) −3.80 .72 .42 .6
Fed Funds Rate‡ 0.30 .90 .90 .9
Inﬂation −0.71 .62 .22 .2
Population 1.11 .11 .11 .1
Implied Per Capita Real Housing Wealth −14.4 −6.72 .1∗ 2.1∗
Pessimistic House Prices −22 −7 −−
Unemployment Rate 8.91 0 .39 .18 .2
Disposable Income (Per Capita) −3.80 .72 .42 .6
Fed Funds Rate‡ 0.30 .90 .90 .9
Inﬂation −0.71 .62 .22 .2
Population 1.11 .11 .11 .1
Implied Per Capita Real Housing Wealth −22.4 −9.72 .1∗ 2.1∗
Optimistic House Prices −6 −1 −−
Unemployment Rate 7.97 .36 .75 .4
Disposable Income (Per Capita) −3.80 .72 .42 .6
Fed Funds Rate‡ 0.30 .90 .90 .9
Inﬂation −0.71 .62 .22 .2
Population 1.11 .11 .11 .1
Implied Per Capita Real Housing Wealth −6.4 −3.72 .1∗ 2.1∗
Note: ∗: Mean growth of housing wealth, ‡: Fed funds rate is approximated with Consensus forecasts of
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optimistic scenario.Figure 13 Consumption Counterfactuals
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not distinguished; “H&F” signiﬁes the case where housing and ﬁnancial wealth are allowed to have diﬀerent
coeﬃcients; “Base” refers to the baseline scenario described in the text; “Pess” reﬂects the pessimistic scenario;
“Opt” reﬂects the optimistic scenario; “Consensus” shows the Consensus forecast referenced in the text.Figure 14 Saving Rates (Percent)
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Note: “Tot W” simulations use coeﬃcient estimates from a model where housing and ﬁnancial wealth are
not distinguished; “H&F” signiﬁes the case where housing and ﬁnancial wealth are allowed to have diﬀerent
coeﬃcients; “Base” refers to the baseline scenario described in the text; “Pess” reﬂects the pessimistic scenario;
“Opt” reﬂects the optimistic scenario; “Consensus” shows the Consensus forecast referenced in the text.CFS Working Paper Series: 
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